Health and Utilization Effects of Increased Access to Publicly Provided Health Care: Evidence from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs by Boyle, Melissa
College of the Holy Cross
CrossWorks
Economics Department Working Papers Economics Department
1-1-2009
Health and Utilization Effects of Increased Access
to Publicly Provided Health Care: Evidence from
the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
Melissa Boyle
College of the Holy Cross, mboyle@holycross.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://crossworks.holycross.edu/econ_working_papers
Part of the Economics Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics Department at CrossWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Department Working Papers by an authorized administrator of CrossWorks.
Recommended Citation
Boyle, Melissa, "Health and Utilization Effects of Increased Access to Publicly Provided Health Care: Evidence from the U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs" (2009). Economics Department Working Papers. Paper 41.
http://crossworks.holycross.edu/econ_working_papers/41
Health and Utilization Effects of Increased Access to Publicly





 COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
FACULTY RESEARCH SERIES, PAPER NO. 09-02*
Department of Economics






All papers in the Holy Cross Working Paper Series should be considered draft versions subject*
to future revision. Comments and suggestions are welcome.
Department of Economics, Box 191A, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA†
01610-2395, 508-793-2334 (phone), 508-793-3710 (fax), mboyle@holycross.edu
Health and Utilization Effects of Increased Access to Publicly




College of the Holy Cross
January 2009
Abstract
During the mid-1990s, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs overhauled its health care
system in an attempt to increase quality and efficiency.  The restructuring involved the adoption
of a capitated payment system and treatment methods based on the managed care model.  This
reorganization was accompanied by a major expansion in the population eligible to receive VA
care.  Using the National Health Interview Survey and VA medical claims data, this study
analyzes both the efficiency of providing public health care in a managed care setting and the
effectiveness of expanding coverage to healthier and wealthier populations.  I estimate that
between 35 and 70 percent of new take-up of VA care was the result of individuals dropping
private health insurance.  While utilization of services increased, estimates of the impact on
aggregate veteran health imply that the policy change did not result in net health improvements. 
Regions providing more care to healthier, newly-eligible veterans had bigger reductions in
hospital care and larger increases in outpatient services for previously-eligible veterans.  This
shift away from specialty care may help to explain the aggregate health declines.
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I.  Introduction 
 
In recent years there has been much focus in the political arena on the need for an 
improved system of public health care in the United States.  With 45 million Americans 
currently uninsured, politicians often insist that the U.S. government should provide the 
same type of universal coverage for health expenditures that exists in other industrialized 
nations.  In spite of years of national debate, however, a consensus has yet to be formed 
on a public insurance model for the entire United States.  Often overlooked in these 
discussions is the fact that the United States government already owns and operates one 
of the largest health care systems in the world – the Veterans Health Administration 
(VHA). 
The VHA is the principal agency of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and 
the largest integrated health care system in the United States, with a budget of $25 billion 
for 2003.  Sweeping changes in VA health care over the past decade have resulted in a 
system designed in the spirit of the U.S. managed care model.  These changes were meant 
to increase both the quality and availability of health care provided to United States 
veterans.  VA’s 1,300 care facilities include 163 hospitals, 850 ambulatory care and 
community-based outpatient clinics, 206 counseling centers, 137 nursing homes and 43 
domiciliary facilities (VA Fact Sheet, 2002).1   
Historically, the VA health care system was a network of hospitals, established 
over 70 years ago to provide specialty care to veterans with injuries or conditions directly 
resulting from their military service.  Over time, the system expanded to include care for 
low-income veterans with non service-connected conditions.  VA provided mainly 
                                                 
1 These provide shelter, food and necessary medical care to veterans disabled by age or disease but not in 
need of skilled nursing care or hospitalization. 
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inpatient care, with outpatient services for non service-connected conditions available 
only as a follow-up to an inpatient stay.   
In 1995 the VHA began restructuring, shifting from hospital-based specialty care 
to an emphasis on primary care and prevention.  The total number of patients treated in 
VA hospitals dropped 44 percent between 1989 and 1999, while the total number of 
outpatient visits increased 66 percent (Klein & Stockford, 2001).  In addition to this 
change, the VHA’s resource allocation system was redesigned.  Following the HMO 
model, VA began distributing dollars using a capitated, patient-based formula.2   
As a result of these changes, VA anticipated that increased efficiency would lead 
to significant reductions in costs per patient and in necessary staff.  With this in mind, 
VA also changed its rules on eligibility for care.  Prior to the reform, VA guaranteed care 
only to veterans with service-connected conditions or low incomes; following the 
restructuring, all veterans became eligible for VA health care (GAO/T-HEHS-99-109). 
The reorganization of the VHA has similarities to reforms in other parts of the 
U.S. health care sector.  The literature evaluating these reforms does not provide a clear 
picture of the expected impact of such changes in the VHA.  Within the private sector, 
managed care methods appear to have been successful at reducing costs per patient 
without negatively impacting health outcomes (e.g. Cutler and Sheiner 1997, Cutler, 
McClellan and Newhouse 2000).  In public health care, however, it remains unclear 
whether managed care might achieve the same success.  In a study of Medicaid HMOs, 
Duggan (2004) finds increases in spending and worsening health outcomes as a result of 
the switch to managed care. 
                                                 
2 In a capitated payment system, the health care provider is reimbursed a flat dollar amount for each patient 
regardless of the services performed. 
 2
 Studies of public insurance expansions focusing on the increases in Medicaid 
eligibility in the late 1980s and early 1990s (e.g. Cutler and Gruber 1996, Dubay and 
Kenney 1997)  have estimated that between 10 percent and 50 percent of new program 
enrollees are individuals who drop private health insurance in order to take up the public 
program.  The expansion in VA coverage provides another opportunity to study the 
impact of offering public health care to a larger number of individuals, when newly-
eligibles are drawn from a less vulnerable population in terms of income and health. 
This paper is the first comprehensive study of these issues within the VA health 
care system.  Papers that have examined the shift from hospital-based to outpatient-based 
care within the VHA (Ashton et al. 2003 and Thibodeau 2003) look at simple time trends 
in various health outcomes and conclude that the reorganization did not lead to health 
declines and may have resulted in health improvements along some dimensions.  These 
studies, however, fail to control for overall health trends in the United States (for 
example, declining mortality and morbidity rates) and look at extremely short post-
reform periods which do not capture the expansion in coverage.  Therefore, while these 
findings may be suggestive, they are not conclusive.   
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that increased eligibility has resulted in severe 
overcrowding, particularly in regions serving a higher than average proportion of newly-
eligible veterans (New York Times, 9/4/02).  Even with the potential increases in the 
quality of care delivered, it is uncertain what the health effects of the reforms have been 
for the veteran population as a whole.  Various competing effects make it difficult to 
predict whether aggregate veteran health should improve or decline as a result of these 
changes.  On the one hand, as a result of the eligibility expansion, a large group of 
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veterans has access to a previously unavailable form of health insurance.  This, coupled 
with the fact that VA-users are now enrolled in a health care system that offers many 
more services than the old hospital-based care model, could lead to significant 
improvements in access to care and health outcomes.  It is unclear however, whether 
newly-eligible veterans who may switch to VA care from another form of insurance are 
receiving superior care as a result.  Additionally, if capacity has not expanded enough to 
compensate for the increase in demand for VA-provided care, veterans who were reliant 
on the VHA prior to the reforms may now be receiving less than adequate care because of 
overcrowding. 
The goals of this paper are therefore twofold.  I first evaluate the impact of the 
policy change on the health and health care utilization of the entire U.S. veteran 
population.  I find increases in total health care utilization by veterans but evidence of net 
health declines.  I therefore test whether the amount of care provided by the VHA to 
veterans in the previously-eligible categories is lower in regions which have 
proportionally more newly-eligible veterans in the patient load.  This allows me to 
determine whether the declines in health may be the result of healthier, higher-income 
veterans crowding-out care to VA’s more vulnerable veteran populations.  I find no 
evidence of crowd-out in total services provided, but instead find that regions with more 
newly-eligibles are shifting more of their care provision from inpatient to outpatient 
settings.  Taken together, these findings suggest that financial constraints may have led to 





II.  VHA Reform Details 
 
By the early 1990s, the structure of the VA health care system had come under 
scrutiny.  Critics of government-run health care pointed out that the U.S. government was 
already managing a very large health care system with a reputation for outdated, sub-par 
methods of care provision.  The U.S. government determined that an overhaul of the 
VHA was necessary in order to repair the reputation of the health care system and to keep 
up with progress in American health care in general.   
One of the biggest steps in the reorganization of the VHA was the passage of the 
Veteran’s Health Care Eligibility Reform Act of 1996.  Passed in October, this legislation 
was designed to restructure VA health care for increased efficiency.  It led to the creation 
of the Medical Benefits Package, a health benefits plan available to all enrolled veterans.  
The plan covers services such as primary health care, diagnosis and treatment, surgery, 
mental health and substance abuse treatment, home health care, respite and hospice care, 
urgent and limited emergency care, drugs and pharmaceuticals, and preventive services 
such as immunizations and screening tests (VA Fact Sheet, 2002).  
The Act also created a priority-based enrollment system for veterans using VA 
health care.  All veterans who wish to receive VA care must enroll in the system, with the 
exception of those with a service-connected disability rating of 50 percent disabled or 
higher, those seeking care only for a service-connected condition, and those discharged 
from active duty for a disability incurred within the prior 12 months who have not yet 
received a disability rating.  Veterans who enroll are placed in one of seven priority 
groups; veterans assigned to group one are considered the highest priority for treatment 
while veterans in group seven are considered lowest priority.  (Group one veterans are 
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those with service-connected conditions resulting in disability of 50 percent or higher; 
group seven veterans are those with incomes above VA determined means-test thresholds 
and no service-connected disabilities who agree to pay certain co-payments.)  During the 
time period examined in this study, priority groups were used only for enrollment 
purposes.  For all those enrolled, routine care was to be provided on a first-come first-
served basis.   
VA is required to enroll only those veterans for whom it has sufficient resources 
to provide timely health care, but for the years relevant to this study VA determined that 
its resources were adequate to enroll all priority groups.3  According to the 1996 
legislation, VA could not provide hospital care or medical services to unenrolled veterans 
after October 1, 1998.  VA began accepting applications for enrollment in October 1997, 
and applications were automatically processed for any veteran who had received care 
since January 1996.  By 2002, the total number of veterans enrolled in the system was 6.6 
million.  In that same year, VA treated 4.5 million veterans, up from 2.5 million in 1995.  
Prior to the legislation, VA was required to provide care only to veterans in priority 
groups 1-6, but could provide care to those in group 7 if resources allowed.  The number 
of priority group 7 veterans treated by VA increased from 107,000 in FY1996 to 828,000 
in FY2001 when they accounted for 22 percent of VA’s workload (GAO-03-161).  
In 1997, VA reformed its resource allocation method through the creation of the 
Veterans Equitable Resource Allocation (VERA) system.  VERA was implemented to 
improve the distribution of resources among VA facilities.  Most funds distributed 
through VERA are allocated based on expected patient load, and are adjusted according 
                                                 
3 As of January 2003 VA began denying care to new enrollees in the lowest priority group.  This is not a 
concern for this analysis, however, as the data only extend through 2002. 
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to case-mix.  Funds are distributed to the administrations of each of the VHA’s 21 
regional networks.  These Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISNs) are then able to 
distribute their budgets across facilities as they see fit.  VISNs receive a fixed dollar 
amount for each patient, so VERA provides incentives to increase the number of cases 
treated while minimizing the costs per case. 4  Most priority 7 veterans are excluded from 
the patient load calculation, however.5  Thus, networks serving a higher than average 
proportion of priority group 7 veterans have fewer budgeted resources per patient than 
networks with a lower proportion (RAND report, 2001).   
VA rationalized that excluding the healthier (less costly) group 7 individuals from 
the formula would eliminate the incentive to treat these veterans preferentially, to the 
detriment of veterans in the other priority groups.  They also reasoned that co-payments 
by the priority 7 veterans would defray the costs of treating these individuals.  However, 
networks with higher proportions of priority 7 enrollees consistently complain about 
resource shortages and serious appointment backlogs.  The United States General 
Accounting Office (GAO) and VA’s Office of Inspector General have both 





                                                 
4 Under the case-mix adjustment, expected patients are classified as being either “Basic Care” or “Complex 
Care.”  Vested Basic Care patients (those with routine health needs) were allotted $3,126 in 2001 while 
each Complex Care patient was allotted $42,765.  Adjustments are also made for variations in labor costs 
across regions (RAND report, 2001). 
5 Only those in the complex care category are included – about 8 percent of priority 7 veterans were 
included in 2000. 
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III.  Predicted Effects of VHA Reforms 
 
The VHA reforms have potentially competing effects on health care utilization 
and health outcomes.  Following the policy change, all U.S. veterans became eligible for 
VA care, and therefore had to choose between the VHA and other health care providers.  
Such a decision is based on the relative value of treatment in each system, determined by 
factors such as the cost of care, wait time for care, and time to recovery following 
treatment.  For an individual choosing between VA and the private sector, these factors 
may vary substantially before and after the policy change. 
Prior to restructuring, low-income and disabled veterans could receive VA care 
for free, but the services provided were limited by the hospital-based nature of the health 
care system.  For some priority 1-6 veterans, the value of VA hospital care was lower 
than the cost of privately purchased comprehensive insurance.  For others, the cost of 
private care was prohibitive and if their particular needs were not met by available VA 
services, these individuals went without any care. 
Previously-eligible veterans had more incentive to take up VA care following the 
reorganization because of the benefits expansion.  Services remained free for veterans in 
groups 1-6, and the scope of VA coverage widened substantially.  For poor and disabled 
veterans, the expected impact of the increase in benefits is increased utilization and 
improved health outcomes. 
At the same time, as a result of the expansion in eligibility, newly-eligible 
veterans began queuing for care with previously-eligibles.  If capacity did not expand 
enough to meet the increased demand for services, wait times for care provided to 
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priority 1-6 veterans would have increased.  As a result, these individuals may have 
received fewer services relative to the pre-period.  In some cases, the cost imposed by 
increased wait times may have induced previously-eligibles to seek care elsewhere or not 
at all.  The broader range of services may not have benefited these veterans if they had to 
wait longer for appointments.  The eligibility expansion therefore would be expected to 
result in decreased utilization and potential health declines for the previously-eligible 
population.  For veterans in priority groups 1-6, the expected advantages of the expansion 
in services combined with the disadvantages of longer wait times make it impossible to 
predict the net effect on utilization and health.  
Veterans in priority group 7 were not eligible to receive VA care prior to the 
reforms.  Unless they qualified for some other public insurance program, these 
individuals had to choose between purchasing private coverage and foregoing medical 
care.  As a result of open enrollment, these veterans gained access to a form of 
comprehensive health insurance that was formerly unavailable.   
For newly-eligible veterans who were otherwise uninsured or who had difficulty 
paying for care, the expected result would be an increase in health care utilization which 
could in turn have significant health benefits.  Other veterans, however, may have 
dropped private insurance in order to take up VA care.  For individuals shifting from 
private to public health care coverage, the impact on health and utilization would depend 
on the quantity and quality of care provided in the two systems.  It is likely that the 
effects of merely switching from one form of coverage to another would be negligible.  
The impact of the VA policy change on aggregate veteran health is determined by 
a complicated set of factors, many of which have opposing predicted effects on health 
 9
care utilization and health outcomes.  The consequences of this reform for the previously- 
and newly-eligible subsets of the veteran population are uncertain, and it is therefore 




IV.  Aggregate Health and Utilization Effects  
  
Because the implications of the VA reforms are unclear, I turn to empirical 
evidence to determine the effect on health care utilization and health outcomes for the 
veteran population.  In assessing the impact of this policy change it is important to 
examine the effects on the aggregate veteran population rather than just VA-users.  If 
care to previously-eligibles is crowded out by newly-eligibles, some individuals may 
receive no treatment and thus will not show up in the VA system.  An analysis examining 
only users of the VHA would therefore miss the potential negative impact on these 
individuals.     
 
A.  Data and Empirical Model 
 
 I use data from the National Health Interview Survey (1992-2001) to examine the 
impact of the changes in the VA system on aggregate veteran health.  This survey is a 
nationally representative sample of repeated cross-sections containing information on 
individuals’ self-reported health and utilization of health services.  The NHIS contains an 
indicator for whether the individual in question is a veteran as well as data on an 
individual’s health insurance coverage, but no information about health care providers 
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(i.e. whether a particular veteran actually sought VA treatment).6  I therefore utilize this 
survey to examine the effects of the policy change on the health of the entire veteran 
population.   
   I use a difference-in-differences estimation strategy to compare the health of 
veterans and non-veterans before and after the enactment of the 1996 legislation.  
Because of the small number of female veterans and very young veterans in the data, I 
restrict my sample to include all surveyed males age 25 and over.  The treated population 
is therefore male veterans age 25 and older, and the control group is male non-veterans 
over the age of 25.  Since changes in the VHA are implemented throughout 1996 and 
1997, I define 1992-1995 as the pre-policy period and 1998-2001 as the post-policy 
period.  I estimate the following equation: 
 
(1) yit = β0 + β1veterani +β2postt*veterani +β3Xit + δt + μit  
 
where: 
 yit = measures of health outcomes and utilization 
 veterani = 1 if individual has been honorably discharged from active military duty 
 postt = 1  in post-policy period 
Xit = vector of individual characteristics:  age group dummies, age group*veteran 
status, race, marital status, years of education, income group, employment status, 
region, and an urban-rural indicator 
δt  = year dummy variables   
and,  
μit = a random error term. 
 
                                                 
6 For the years 1992-1995 I also make use of the NHIS Health Insurance Supplement.  Health insurance 
information was incorporated into the main surveys in 1997. 
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Summary statistics are shown in Table 1.  Comparing these statistics for the 
veteran and non-veteran populations reveals that the veteran population is older than the 
non-veteran population.  For this reason, I include an age*veteran interaction term in my 
regressions, allowing age to enter differently for the two populations.  The age difference 
likely accounts for at least some of the differences in average characteristics between the 
two groups.  Veterans are less likely to be currently employed but have slightly higher 
average income and are more likely to be married.  In addition, a smaller proportion of 
the veteran sample is Hispanic or black. 
 I employ a variety of health and health care utilization measures to assess the 
impact of the policy change on the veteran population.  The utilization measures include 
hospital nights in the past year, hospital stays in the past year, an indicator for whether 
the individual has visited a doctor in the past year and a count of doctor visits in the past 
two weeks.  It is unclear whether changes in utilization indicate a change in health status 
or a change in access to care, but examining the effect on these variables and the health 
measures simultaneously will provide evidence of the impact of the policy change on 
both overall health and care availability.  In addition to examining the utilization of 
particular health care services, I test measures of health insurance coverage, to see 
whether veterans drop private health insurance as a result of the policy change.  
Health outcome measures include a self-report of the individual’s health status 
(poor, fair, good, very good or excellent) and three 0-1 indicators of physical limitation 
based on activities of daily living (ADL) measures. These variables indicate whether an 
individual is limited in the ability to work, needs help with personal care, or is limited in 
any way.  While it is difficult to quantify health, ADLs have been shown to be excellent 
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predictors of morbidity and mortality.7  Since the NHIS does not contain mortality 
information, the ADL measures are the best available means of assessing the health 
effects of the policy change.  In general, the average non-veteran in the sample reports 
slightly better health and spends fewer days in bed than the average veteran.  In addition, 
the average non-veteran is less likely to report physical limitations and uses fewer health 
care services (hospital and outpatient).   
 
B.  Crowd-Out of Private Insurance 
 
I first examine the impact of the policy change on health insurance coverage for 
the average veteran.  The cost effectiveness of any public health insurance expansion will 
depend in part on how much of the newly-covered population was previously uninsured.  
Such a policy is expected to have a smaller impact on public health if a large portion of 
new users drops other forms of health insurance in order to take up the new program.  
Table 2 presents the results of probit estimations of equation 1, where the dependent 
variables are various forms of health care coverage.  The reported coefficients are probit 
marginal effects.   
Veterans are less likely to hold private health insurance as a result of the VA 
expansion.  Now that they have access to free (or very low cost in the case of those 
paying co-payments) and comprehensive health care services through the VHA, some 
veterans appear to no longer value coverage purchased through a private insurer.  As 
shown in column 1, the average veteran’s probability of being covered by private health 
insurance drops by 5 percent as a result of the policy change.  In addition, column 2 
                                                 
7 Wiener et al. (1990) provide a list of papers which give evidence of the predictive power of ADLs in 
determining health. 
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shows that veterans are about 1 percent more likely to have no health insurance coverage 
other than VA as a result of restructuring.8   
In columns 3-5, I test whether veterans drop other public programs as a result of 
the VA expansion.  I check for declines in Medicare Part B coverage (Part B is the buy-in 
portion of Medicare which covers outpatient services) and whether there is any effect on 
take-up of Medicaid or other public insurance programs.  Nearly all Medicare-eligibles in 
the United States buy into Part B.  I test the impact on take-up for this program because 
of the fact that the VA Medical Benefits Plan is more generous than Medicare Part B 
coverage along some dimensions (for example, VA covers prescription drugs and routine 
physicals).  Although the coefficient of interest is negative in the Part B equation, it is not 
statistically significantly different from zero.  In addition, there appears to be no impact 
of the policy change on Medicaid or other forms of public insurance.    
Prior to the policy change, about 80 percent of the veteran population was 
privately insured.  The 5 percent decline in the probability that the average veteran has 
private insurance is therefore about a 4 percentage point drop in the veteran insurance 
rate, implying that 1.4 million veterans drop their private coverage.  At the same time, 
about 2 million veterans take up VA care as a result of the policy change.  Based on these 
numbers, about 70 percent of new take-up is offset by individuals who drop their private 
coverage.  This is significantly higher than even the largest estimates of private insurance 
crowd-out in the Medicaid literature.  This estimate is an upper-bound, because some 
                                                 
8 There is not perfect offset between the increase in no coverage and the drop in private coverage mainly 
because individuals dropping private coverage may be simultaneously covered by public programs other 
than VA.  Tests on Medicare-eligibles in the sample show a significant drop in private insurance by 
veterans in this category.  These individuals, who held private insurance in addition to their Medicare 
coverage, may have determined that Medicare combined with VA was sufficient, and that supplemental 
private insurance was no longer needed after the VA expansion. 
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veterans may drop their private coverage planning to use VA should the need arise, but 
then never actually take up the public program.  Additionally, this case differs from the 
Medicaid expansions because it is likely that some of those dropping private insurance 
may not be individuals taking up the program for the first time.  The switch to a much 
more comprehensive coverage of health care services may lead previous users who had 
private coverage to switch to relying only on VA care. 
A lower-bound on the crowd-out estimate can be obtained by looking at the 
number of veterans who enrolled in the VHA following the policy change.  By 2002, 6.6 
million veterans had signed up to receive care.  The patient load prior to restructuring was 
about 2.5 million, implying that after the reform about 4 million new veterans had 
indicated an interest in the VA program.  During the same year, however, only about 2 
million new veterans were treated.  It is likely that some of the individuals dropping 
private insurance were among the 2 million veterans who enrolled but did not use VA 
care.  Based on the fact that about half of the new enrollees actually take up, it is 
reasonable to assume that an equivalent proportion of those dropping their insurance 
coverage are actually using VA care.  This implies a lower-bound crowd-out estimate of 
about 35 percent. 
 
C.  Effects on Health Care Utilization  
 
I next turn to estimating the effect of the policy change on utilization of health 
care services.  In light of the fact that a non-trivial proportion of VA users appears to be 
substituting away from private insurance, it is uncertain whether the reforms will have a 
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significant impact on utilization.  For veterans dropping private insurance as a result of 
the policy change, the expected impact on total health care utilization is not large.  For 
other groups of veterans, however, the effects could be substantial.  Fully 18 percent of 
the veteran sample was without health insurance in the pre-period.  These individuals 
now have access to a new form of health care, which could have a noticeable impact on 
average utilization.  Additionally, previously-eligible veterans now have a different range 
of services at their disposal, but could also potentially be waiting in longer lines for care.  
The expected impact on their health care utilization is uncertain. 
Table 3 reports the effect of the policy change on the utilization of health care 
inputs by veterans.  The tested inputs in the equations reported in this table include 
number of hospital stays in the past 12 months, number of nights spent in the hospital in 
the past 12 months, an indicator for whether the individual had a doctor visit in the past 
year, an indicator for whether the individual had a doctor visit in the past two weeks, and 
the number of doctor visits in the past two weeks.  Column 1 shows a negative and 
significant drop in the number of nights the average veteran spent in the hospital in the 
past year as a result of the policy change.  The number of hospital nights for the average 
veteran falls by -.1, which is approximately a 9 percent decrease in length of hospital 
stays relative to the pre-period.   
With the exception of the number of hospital nights, all coefficients are positive 
and highly significant, indicating an overall increase in health care utilization by veterans 
following the policy change.  Although the coefficient on number of hospital stays is 
positive, it is also small, indicating very little change in the number of admissions.  This 
is not surprising; anecdotal evidence indicates that veterans with conditions serious 
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enough to warrant hospitalization continued to receive timely care after the reforms 
(Twombly, 2003).  This finding is also consistent with the estimated effects of managed 
care on the private sector.  In general, managed care payment methods result in shorter 
hospital stays but no significant change in the total number of hospital admissions (Cutler 
& Sheiner 1997). 
While the length of hospital stays declines, use of outpatient services increases 
substantially.  As a result of the policy change, the average veteran is 3 percent more 
likely to have had a doctor visit in the past year and 1.4 percent more likely to have 
visited the doctor in the past two weeks.  The average number of doctor visits in the past 
two weeks increases by .04, a 14 percent increase in two-week outpatient visits for 
veterans.  In spite of substantial shifting from private insurance, it does appear that 
overall utilization of health services increased for the veteran population as a result of 
restructuring. 
 
D.  Effects on Health Outcomes 
 
Results for the effect of the reforms on health outcomes are reported in Table 4.  
All coefficients indicate a decline in veteran health as a result of the policy change, 
although the coefficient of interest in column 1 (the indicator for needing help with 
personal care) is insignificant.  The policy change has a small positive effect on the 
probability that a veteran is limited in the ability to work.  In addition, there is a larger 
positive effect on the probability that a veteran reports being limited in any way, with the 
policy change increasing this probability by 2 percent.  In column 4, I test whether 
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veterans’ self-reported health is affected.  I re-code the self-reported health measure as 
being equal to 1 if an individual reports excellent or very good health, and equal to zero if 
health is reported as being good, fair or poor.  Following restructuring, the average 
veteran is 2 percent less likely to report either excellent or very good health.     
It appears that while there are increases in health care utilization for the veteran 
population as a whole, the aggregate impact on veteran health is negative.  In considering 
what may cause this result, it is important to observe that the change in VA benefits 
increased the covered population from roughly 40 percent of the veteran population to all 
veterans in the United States.  Many veterans who were not receiving care previously 
may now have had access to care.  The newly-covered individuals, however, tend to be 
relatively healthier, and their health improvements may be small when compared to the 
magnitude of the negative effects of crowd-out or longer wait times on the previously-
eligible population.  This possibility therefore invites a more detailed consideration of 
whether benefits to the newly-eligible population outweigh costs to previously-eligible 
VA-users.    
 
E.  Specification Checks 
 
 Before turning to an in-depth analysis of the impact of the policy change on 
various subsets of the veteran population, I perform a number of specification checks.  In 
interpreting the coefficients in the above equations, I have assumed that the health and 
utilization effects are indeed a result of the changes in VA health care.  The history 
behind the restructuring of the VHA and literature on similar changes in other health care 
systems supports this assumption.  It is hypothetically possible, however, that the policy 
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change arose from some pre-existing trend in veteran health, and that the changes in the 
post-period do not reflect changes in care provision.  For example, veteran and non-
veteran health may be moving relative to one another as a result of unobservables that are 
unrelated to VA policy and are not captured by the controls included in the regressions.   
In order to confirm that the changes in veteran health and utilization actually 
result from the changes in VA health care, I check for pre-existing trends by estimating 
the same diff-in-diff regressions on pre-policy data.  I choose the years 1991-1994 
because this is a period when no major changes took place in the VHA.  I code the years 
1991 and 1992 as the “pre” years, and 1993 and 1994 as “post” years.  The results of 
these falsification tests are reported in Tables 5a and 5b.  In general, coefficients are quite 
small and insignificant, implying no previously existing trends impacting veteran health. 
Most striking are the health outcome results reported in Table 5b.  These 
coefficients are consistently the opposite sign from those found in the main regressions, 
indicating that veteran health was slightly improving prior to the policy change, whereas 
it declines sharply thereafter.  The only highly significant, same-signed coefficient in 
these falsification checks is that on the indicator for visiting the doctor in the last two 
weeks, and even this is quite small – about 2.5 times smaller than the coefficient in the 
main regressions.   Evidence from these regressions therefore overwhelmingly suggests 
that the effects in the main specifications are in fact the result of the VA overhaul and not 
caused by pre-existing trends. 
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 As a further test, I also predict self-reported health for a veteran and non-veteran 
with the same characteristics.  I do this by running the following regression in each year 
of the sample separately for the veteran and non-veteran populations: 
(2)    yi = β0 + β1Xi + μi, 
where yi is the self-reported health measure (ranging from 0 to 4, where 0 is poor and 4 is 
excellent) and Xi contains the same controls as in equation 1.   
I use these point estimates to predict veteran and non-veteran health in each year 
by calculating the fitted values of the dependent variable for a veteran and non-veteran, 
using the same characteristics for both predictions.  The characteristics I choose are the 
average for the non-veteran population.  I then difference predicted veteran and non-
veteran health and calculate the standard error of the difference.  Results are shown in 
Figure 1.  As the figure demonstrates, there is a positive but insignificant difference 
between predicted veteran and non-veteran health (where a higher self-report indicates 
better health) in the pre-period.  This difference becomes negative and significant in the 
post-period.  This is further evidence that the veteran health declines are a result of the 
policy change and not some other unobservable trend.   
 
F.  Which Veterans Are Affected? 
 
The coefficients reported in Tables 2-4 show the impact of the policy change on 
the aggregate veteran population.  Although these results give evidence of the effects on 
veterans overall, it is unclear whether these effects are the result of take-up by the newly-
insured or changes in care provision to the previously-eligible population.  For this 
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reason, I split the sample into two groups:  expected previously-eligibles and expected 
newly-eligibles.   
I categorize a veteran as previously-eligible (i.e. priority 1-6) if the individual has 
an income below VA-established means-test cutoffs (adjusted for the number of 
dependents in the household) or the individual reports being limited in any way.  Since 
there is no indicator for service-connected disability in the survey, I assume that any 
disabled veteran is service-connected disabled.  I therefore overestimate the number of 
priority 1-6 veterans in the sample.  I define a veteran as newly-eligible (i.e. priority 7) if 
the individual reports no activity limitation and has an income above the means-test 
cutoff.  I then estimate the same equations as reported in Tables 2-4 for each subset of the 
veteran population, where my control group for previously-eligible veterans is low-
income or disabled non-vets and the control for the newly-eligible veterans is higher-
income and non-disabled non-vets.  
Results are reported in Tables 6a and 6b.  The last row of Table 6b indicates 
whether the coefficients for previously and newly eligibles are significantly different 
from one another.  I do not report results from regressions for the two samples where the 
dependent variables are indicators of health insurance coverage, because the coefficients 
for the two groups are never significantly different.  Among the reported regressions, the 
two veteran samples are impacted differentially in three out of the six cases.  The decline 
in hospital nights in the main results turns out to fall entirely on the previously-eligible 
population.  This is as expected, and is encouraging evidence that the methodology for 
splitting the sample results in good estimates of the two subsets of the veteran population.  
The previously-eligible population is subject to the change in the nature of VA care 
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provision from hospital-based to outpatient-based services.  The newly-eligible 
population, on the other hand, was (for the most part) not in the VA system before the 
change and did not experience this shift.  It is therefore not surprising that hospital nights 
fall for the previously-eligible population only.  In all other cases, both groups are 
affected similarly by the policy change, although some effects are slightly larger for the 
previously-eligibles. 
The results in Table 6 establish that both subsets of the veteran population are 
affected by the policy change.  This demonstrates that the results in Tables 2 through 4 
are, for the most part, picking up effects for both newly- and previously-eligible veterans.  
It does not allow for a determination of which group is impacted more, however.  While 
the effects on doctor visits seem a bit larger for the previously-eligible population, this is 
likely in part because these veterans are receiving more outpatient services in exchange 
for fewer inpatient services under the new VA system.  Additionally, in spite of the 
increase in services, veterans in both groups still report a decline in health.   
 
 
V.  Are More Vulnerable Veterans Crowded Out?  
 
The NHIS results show that for the average veteran, health care utilization, 
particularly of outpatient services, increases as a result of the changes in the VHA.  They 
also demonstrate that this increase is not coupled with health improvements, but rather 
appears to be associated with declines in various measures of self-reported health.  The 
declines in health for the previously-eligible population are of a particular concern, 
because these are the most vulnerable veterans – those VA is most concerned with 
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serving.  Anecdotal evidence on overcrowding (e.g. The Boston Globe, 1/1/03) suggests 
that the health declines for priority group 1-6 veterans may reflect crowd-out of services 
to these veterans by those in priority group 7.  In spite of VA’s expansion in services, if 
veterans in priority groups 1-6 are competing for care with those in group 7, these 
veterans may be treated less intensively than they were prior to the expansion.  In order to 
check whether this can explain the demonstrated decline in health, I utilize data that will 
allow me to look specifically at the impact of the expansion on users of VA health care. 
 
A.  Data and Empirical Model 
 
 For this section of the paper, I turn to two additional data sources:  the Current 
Population Survey Veterans Supplements (1993, 1997 and 1999) and VA Patient 
Treatment File (PTF) and Outpatient Care (OPC) claims records (1993-2002).  The PTF 
and OPC claims records are large administrative files containing detailed information on 
every treatment episode in every VA facility.  Because of the sheer size of these files, I 
aggregate to the VISN-year level.  I use the PTF and OPC records to calculate treatment 
intensity for veterans in priority groups 1-6 and 7 in each VISN-year.  I calculate the total 
number of hospital nights, hospital stays, surgeries, inpatient procedures, clinic visits, and 
total contacts9 for group 1-6 and group 7 veterans in each VISN-year.  
The CPS Veterans Supplements contain an indicator of service-connected 
disability status for the veteran sample, and are therefore used to provide population 
estimates of the number of veterans in priority groups 1-6 and 7 within each VISN.  
Because an individual must enroll in VA health care in order to be assigned to a priority 
                                                 
9 Total contacts are defined as hospital stays plus clinic visits. 
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group, the actual number of these individuals in the population is not known and 
therefore must be estimated.  I use geographic identifiers in the CPS to assign veterans to 
a VISN.   I separate priority group 7 veterans from those in groups 1-6 based on income 
(where the means test threshold is adjusted for number of dependents) and service-
connected disability status.  I also use the CPS to calculate the proportion of veterans in a 
VISN falling into each of six age groups. 
 I again employ a difference-in-differences empirical strategy, this time comparing 
regions providing a high number of services (measured as total contacts) to priority 7 
veterans to those regions providing a low number of services to veterans in group 7.  If it 
is true that newly-eligible veterans crowd out services to previously-eligibles, regions that 
provide more services to veterans in group 7 should therefore provide fewer services to 
those in groups 1-6 relative to other regions after the policy change.  This possibility is 
made especially likely by the nature of the resource allocation system.  Since VERA does 
not reimburse VISNs for treating priority 7 veterans, a region treating more of these 
individuals relative to its 1-6 patient population will have fewer total resources per 
patient.  Regions providing more services to group 7 veterans may, as a result, provide 
fewer services to everyone else in the patient load.   
I define 1993-1996 as the pre-policy period and 1998-2002 as the post-policy 
period, since open enrollment was announced in 1997 but phased in beginning in 1998.   






(3)   services1-6vt/pop1-6v = β0 + β1(contacts7/pop1-6)v*postt +β2Xvt + μvt 
 
where: 
services1-6vt/pop1-6v = Number of services to 1-6 veterans/Population 1-6 
   in a VISN-year, where population 1-6 is estimated from 
   the 1999 CPS 
 
postt = 1 in post-policy period  
 
(contacts7/pop1-6)v =  Average number of contacts to priority 7 veterans 
   in a VISN in the post-period/Population 1-6 in a VISN, 
 where population 1-6 is estimated from the 1999 CPS 
 




μvt = a random error term. 
 
Tables 7a and 7b provide summary statistics on the services variables from the 
VA claims data.  Table 7a reports the average number of treatments in a region provided 
to priority 1-6 and priority 7 veterans in the pre- and post-periods.  Table 7b reports the 
average number of treatments to each priority group divided by the number of priority 
group 1-6 veterans living in the region.  Comparing the pre- and post-period means 
reveals the significant shift from inpatient to outpatient services, as well as the large 
increase in treatments provided to veterans in priority group 7.  
 
B.  Results 
 
I first estimate equation 3 by OLS.  Results are reported in Table 8.  A clear 
pattern emerges in the coefficients of the OLS regressions.  Regions providing a higher 
number of contacts to veterans in priority group 7 do not appear to provide fewer total 
contacts to those in priority groups 1-6 – in fact the exact opposite is true.  At the same 
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time, these regions do provide fewer inpatient services to 1-6 veterans.  It therefore 
appears that regions with greater influxes of new patients are shifting more of their care 
to outpatient provision than less crowded regions.  In order to interpret these results, it is 
helpful to think about the difference in services provided to 1-6 veterans in the region 
providing the highest average number of contacts to priority 7 veterans versus the region 
providing the lowest number.  The region providing the lowest average number of 
contacts to priority 7 veterans relative to the 1-6 population is VISN 10 (Ohio), while the 
region providing the highest number is VISN 23 (North and South Dakota, Iowa, 
Minnesota and Nebraska).  The (contacts7/pop1-6) measure varies from .67 to 2.73, so 
the difference between the highest and lowest regions is around 2.  Based on this, the 
OLS results imply that as a result of the policy change, the region providing the most 
contacts to priority 7 gives priority 1-6 veterans around 7.5 more clinic visits and total 
contacts per 1-6 population than the region providing the fewest contacts to group 7.  A 
similar analysis for hospital nights indicates that the region with the highest concentration 
of group 7 veterans in its patient load provides group 1-6 veterans with .62 fewer hospital 
nights per population 1-6 than the region with the lowest concentration of priority 7 
veterans. 
A potential problem with equation (3) is the endogeneity of the (contacts7/pop1-
6) term.  Within a given region, the services provided to veterans in groups 1-6 and group 
7 will be determined jointly.  Thus, (contacts7/pop1-6)*post may be correlated with the 
error term, in which case OLS will result in a biased estimate of β1.  In order to solve this 
problem, I instrument for (contacts7/pop1-6)*post using two different measures.  The 
first instrument that I use is the post term interacted with the population of priority group 
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7 veterans in a VISN divided by the population of group 1-6 veterans (pop7/pop1-6), as 
estimated in the CPS.10  The location of veterans can be assumed exogenous (i.e., the 
population at large is not determined by VA health care within a VISN).11  Therefore, 
regions with more priority 7 veterans relative to priority 1-6 veterans can reasonably be 
expected to have more priority 7 veterans seeking treatment. 
 An alternative instrument is the post term interacted with the number of priority 7 
veterans who are Medicare-eligible (where any individual over age 65 is coded as 
Medicare-eligible) divided by the CPS measure of the total population of group 1-6 
veterans (pop7+Mcare/pop1-6).  The rationale behind this instrumental variable is the 
strong interest in take-up of VA health care by Medicare-eligible veterans following the 
policy change.  As noted above, the VA Medical Benefits Package includes more 
generous coverage than traditional Medicare for particular services, especially 
pharmaceuticals.  Consequently, Medicare-eligibles in group 7 have taken up VA care at 
very high and increasing rates.  While about 30 percent of priority group 7 veterans in the 
overall veteran population are Medicare-eligible, 52 percent of treated priority 7 veterans 
were Medicare-eligible in 1999.  By 2001, this proportion had increased to 65 percent 
(GAO-03-161). 
While many Medicare-eligibles are interested in VA care primarily for the 
purpose of obtaining low-cost prescription drugs, VA pharmacies cannot fill prescriptions 
written by private physicians. These individuals must therefore receive care from a VA 
                                                 
10 For this variable, population 7 is measured in the 1999 CPS, while population 1-6 is measured in the 
1997 CPS.  This denominator is estimated from a different sample in order to eliminate the division bias 
that could result from correlated measurement error in the denominators of the dependent and independent 
variables. 
11 This reasoning was supported by examining CPS estimates of the fraction of the total U.S. veteran 
population living in each VISN before and after the policy change.  Veterans do not appear to relocate as a 
result of the health care reorganization. 
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primary care physician in order to take advantage of the drug benefit.  Since Medicare 
users are a subset of the veteran population that is highly likely to take up VA care as a 
result of the policy change, I assume that regions with a higher than average number of 
Medicare-eligible 7s relative to the total population of 1-6s will have to treat 
proportionately more group 7 veterans.    
 Results from the first stage regressions are reported in Table 9.  In both cases, the 
coefficient on the instrument is positive and significant, demonstrating the expected 
relationship between the population of priority 7 veterans in a region and the number of 
services provided to those veterans.  Tables 10a and 10b contain the results from the 
second stage.  As in the OLS results, the number of clinic visits and total contacts to 
priority group 1-6 veterans rise relatively more in regions providing more services to 
group 7 after the policy change.  Most of the inpatient measures are small and positive 
and statistically insignificantly different from zero, although the coefficients on hospital 
nights remain negative and in one case, significant.  In table 10a, instrumenting for 
(contacts7/pop1-6)*post with (pop7/pop1-6)*post, the coefficients imply that as a result 
of the policy change, the region providing the most contacts to group 7 veterans relative 
to priority 1-6 veterans will provide 1-6 veterans with 17 more clinic visits per total 1-6 
population and .4 fewer hospital nights (although the hospital measure is insignificant) 
than the region providing the fewest contacts to group 7 veterans.  In table 10b, using the 
(pop7+Mcare)/pop1-6 instrument, the results imply that the policy change leads to .6 
fewer hospital nights and 8 more clinic visits per population of 1-6 veterans in the highest 
contact 7 region versus the lowest. 
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 As with the OLS results, 2SLS estimation suggests that regions serving more 
priority 7 veterans provide more total contacts to veterans in groups 1-6.  At the same 
time, although the second-stage results for many of the inpatient measures are 
insignificant, evidence remains that regions serving more priority 7 veterans shorten 
hospital stays more and provide more of their treatment on an outpatient basis than 
regions serving fewer 7s relative to 1-6s.  While there is no crowd-out in total services to 
previously-eligible veterans by newly-eligibles, it appears that the presence of newly-
eligible veterans results in more substitution toward outpatient-based care for the 
previously-eligible population.  Therefore, one possible explanation for the declines in 
veteran health found in the NHIS results is that the substitution of outpatient for inpatient 
services negatively impacts veterans in the previously-eligible group. 
 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
Analysis of the reforms in the Veterans Health Administration is important both 
for evaluating the VA program itself, and because the nature of these changes provide an 
excellent test case for studying government provision of health care in general.  This 
policy change offers an opportunity to examine the efficiency of providing public health 
care in a managed care setting, as well as the impact of extending health care coverage to 
individuals higher up in the health and income distributions. 
As has been the case with other public health insurance expansions, some of the 
new take-up in VA health care appears to come from individuals who drop their private 
coverage in favor of VA.  Crowd-out of private insurance by the public program is 
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estimated to be between 35 and 70 percent.  This is a larger effect than the 10 to 50 
percent crowd-out measures found in the case of the expansions in Medicaid eligibility.  
The magnitude of the crowd-out of private insurance could stem from two factors.  First, 
a large proportion of the total veteran population was insured prior to the policy change 
(about 80 percent), so much of the increased eligibility was for individuals with other 
forms of health insurance coverage.  Second, both previously- and newly-eligible 
veterans have an incentive to drop private coverage in favor of VA after restructuring 
because of the major expansion in services that accompanied the eligibility expansion. 
Although a potentially large proportion of new VA take-up is individuals who 
were previously privately insured, there are significant utilization and health effects for 
both the newly-eligible and previously-eligible populations.  As in the case of private 
insurance, VA care provision under the managed care model results in shorter hospital 
stays, but more services provided in an outpatient setting.  While in the private sector this 
type of shift does not generally result in significant health declines or in changes in actual 
services provided, this appears not to be the case within the VA.  Although health care 
utilization increases, veteran health declines according to every tested measure.  This is 
more in line with the findings for Medicaid HMOs than private health care, although the 
reasons for declining health in the VHA may be different since Medicaid coverage was 
contracted out to private HMOs whereas VA is entirely government operated. 
Anecdotal evidence, as reported in the popular press and also by the Federal 
government (for example, see the Report on the Budget of the United States Government, 
2003) indicates that the reforms have left veterans in priority groups 1-6 competing for 
care with veterans in group 7.  Tests for crowding-out of services to previously-eligible 
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veterans by the newly-eligible population do not indicate that veterans in more crowded 
regions receive fewer total visits, but rather that these regions shorten hospital stays more 
and alternatively provide more outpatient services relative to less crowded regions.  It is 
possible, therefore, that VA’s attempt to serve a larger (and on average, healthier) 
population has had a detrimental impact on veterans with service-connected conditions. 
Whereas, under the specialty care-based system, VA focused particularly on the needs of 
the most vulnerable veterans, the primary care-based system may substitute away from 
this type of care to the point that particular veterans with serious conditions related to 
their military service are no longer being treated with the same intensity.   
Further research is needed to determine whether declines in specialty care are the 
cause of the negative health effects.  The VA claims data contain diagnosis and treatment 
codes which will enable me to follow individuals with particular conditions over time in 
order to assess the impact of the policy change on treatment of specific health problems.  
I will additionally be able to test whether there is a change in the health composition of 
the previously-eligible population.  This could result if VA specifically attempts to select 
the healthiest (least expensive) veterans.  Bias in managed care towards healthier patient 
populations has been well-documented in the case of Medicare HMOs.12 Constructing 
measures of illness severity using the diagnosis codes in the PTF and OPC files will 
allow me to determine whether the policy change resulted in VA providing more care to 
healthier previously-eligibles, while sicker previously-eligibles wait longer for treatment. 
In the case of the Department of Veterans Affairs, the coverage expansion and 
capitated payment system appear to negatively impact average health.  Further evidence 
is needed, however, to determine what changes would be necessary to achieve health 
                                                 
12 For an overview of this literature, see Hellinger and Wong, 2000. 
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improvements.  It is possible that adjustments in the resource allocation system allowing 
VA to shift more of its resources back to specialty services, or the end of open enrollment 
in 2003 halting the influx of healthier patients will result in a system which balances 
preventive medicine and specialty care in a manner more beneficial to the entire veteran 
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 TABLE 1.  SUMMARY STATISTICS, NHIS 1992-2001  
(Sample Restricted to Males age 25+)  
 Veterans    Non-Veterans 
   
 Pre Post Pre Post 
 (N=43218) (N=28388) (N=89047) (N=88329) 
Age 55.452 57.928 43.190 44.010 
 (14.049) (14.692) (14.5583) (13.725) 
Hispanic .044 .065 .132 .221 
Black .102 .109 .117 .116 
Married .801 .738 .741 .690 
Years Education 12.928 13.081 12.629 12.562 
 (2.783) (2.601) (3.538) (3.485) 
Employed .611 .564 .787 .803 
Midwest .249 .235 .238 .214 
South .337 .369 .327 .350 
West  .220 .218 .228 .252 
Northeast .193 .177 .206 .184 
MSA .762 .777 .790 .817 
Income $0-$4999 .010 .012 .018 .016 
Income $5000-$9999 .037 .023 .045 .029 
Income $10000-
$14999 
.061 .038 .065 .039 
Income $15000-
$19999 
.079 .043 .074 .041 
Income $20000-
$24999 
.082 .055 .075 .049 
Income $25000-
$34999 
.147 .104 .137 .090 
Income $35000-
$44999 




 TABLE 1.  SUMMARY STATISTICS, NHIS Cont.  
 Veterans    Non-Veterans 
 
 Pre Post Pre Post 
 (N=43218) (N=28388) (N=89047) (N=88329) 
Income $45000+ .300 .367 .291 .363 
Health  2.641 2.587 2.839 2.842 
(=0 if poor, 1 if fair, 
2 if good, 3 if very 
good, 4 if excellent) 
(1.164) (1.119) (1.117) (1.061) 
Hospital Nights Last  1.112 1.096 .552 .492 
Year (6.636) (6.590) (3.958) (4.292) 
Hospital Stays Last  .156 .187 .088 .090 
Year (.540) (.892) (.410) (.480) 
Doctor Visit Last 
Year? 
.767 .844 .670 .718 
#Doctor Visits Past  .285 .366 .190 .201 
2 Weeks (.890) (1.240) (.750) (.941) 
Limited in Ability .179 .168 .135 .095 
To Work      
Need Help With  .047 .045 .039 .027 
Personal Care      
Limited in Any Way .244 .219 .167 .120 
Private Health 
Insurance 
.799 .742 .733 .696 
No Health Insurance .175 .138 .262 .217 
Medicare .321 .359 .121 .104 
Medicare Part B 
(Conditional on 
Medicare Eligibility) 




Table 2.  Effects of VA Coverage Expansion on Other Forms of Health Insurance (Probit)  
 
 





Medicare Part B Medicaid Other Public 
Post x veteran -0.04863** 0.00697* -0.00189 0.00146 0.00071 
 (0.00336) (0.00307) (0.00436) (0.00191) (0.00059) 
veteran 0.01321 0.00659 -0.00983 -0.00481** -0.00062 
 (0.01934) (0.00673) (0.00601) (0.00161) (0.00079) 
years education 0.02509** -0.01488** -0.00020 -0.00206** -0.00012** 
 (0.00103) (0.00111) (0.00037) (0.00008) (0.00005) 
Employed 0.23777** -0.04332** -0.02360** -0.06690** -0.00538** 
 (0.01050) (0.00555) (0.00494) (0.00233) (0.00060) 
Midwest 0.03252** -0.01038+ 0.01805** -0.00488** -0.00117* 
 (0.00519) (0.00582) (0.00616) (0.00071) (0.00052) 
South -0.05047** 0.05741** 0.01954** -0.00720** -0.00090+ 
 (0.00797) (0.00751) (0.00387) (0.00049) (0.00047) 
West -0.06699** 0.04643** 0.01833** 0.00114 0.00055 
 (0.00810) (0.00612) (0.00553) (0.00093) (0.00066) 
Urban 0.00921* -0.00161 -0.00685** -0.00196** -0.00055 
 (0.00361) (0.00261) (0.00258) (0.00059) (0.00053) 
hispanic  -0.13504** 0.11958** -0.00908 0.00215** -0.00110** 
 (0.00773) (0.00921) (0.00671) (0.00061) (0.00033) 
Black -0.07772** 0.04614** -0.01645* 0.00810** 0.00010 
 (0.00312) (0.00279) (0.00676) (0.00098) (0.00051) 
Married 0.12343** -0.08929** 0.01256** -0.00652** -0.00057* 
 (0.00397) (0.00671) (0.00409) (0.00029) (0.00027) 
Observations      219014      227790      18208      219181      219078 
Results from estimating equation (1) with Probit regressions.   
Dependent variables are indicators for various sources of insurance coverage. 
Coefficients are probit marginal effects. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on veteran and year. 
Controls also include year, age and income group dummies, age group*veteran interaction terms and a constant 
 











Table 3.  Effects of VA Reforms on Health Care Utilization      
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 








Visits Last 2 
Wks (OLS) 
Dr. Visit Last 2 
Weeks (Probit) 
Post x veteran -0.09921+ 0.01191* 0.03106** 0.03966** 0.01423** 
 (0.04990) (0.00424) (0.00644) (0.00425) (0.00224) 
veteran 0.12845* -0.00129 0.04120** 0.00405 0.01726** 
 (0.04395) (0.00675) (0.00740) (0.01102) (0.00567) 
years education -0.01770** -0.00172** 0.01075** 0.00436** 0.00268** 
 (0.00490) (0.00037) (0.00064) (0.00078) (0.00023) 
Employed -1.34508** -0.15975** -0.09372** -0.22679** -0.08269** 
 (0.06329) (0.00739) (0.00366) (0.01180) (0.00328) 
Midwest -0.05659+ 0.00562* -0.02900** -0.00898 -0.00537+ 
 (0.02972) (0.00258) (0.00435) (0.00682) (0.00281) 
South -0.02998 0.01296** -0.03325** -0.01126 -0.00725** 
 (0.03368) (0.00332) (0.00403) (0.00767) (0.00278) 
West -0.19408** -0.01449** -0.03305** -0.00494 -0.00310 
 (0.03511) (0.00300) (0.00724) (0.01030) (0.00328) 
Urban 0.01579 -0.01025** 0.01281** 0.02335** 0.00853** 
 (0.02124) (0.00268) (0.00376) (0.00592) (0.00158) 
Hispanic -0.07849** -0.01858** -0.06397** -0.03257** -0.02625** 
 (0.02190) (0.00274) (0.00421) (0.00808) (0.00252) 
Black 0.15903** 0.00138 0.01148** -0.00997 -0.00849** 
 (0.03029) (0.00307) (0.00289) (0.00633) (0.00199) 
Married -0.13149** -0.00456+ 0.04741** -0.01763* -0.00321 
 (0.03086) (0.00243) (0.00470) (0.00630) (0.00208) 
Observations      241550      241615      176195      241648      241650 
Results are from estimating Equation (1).  OLS coefficients are reported in columns (1), (2) and (4). 
Probit coefficients in columns (3) and (5) are marginal effects. 
Dependent variables are measures of health care utilization.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on veteran and year. 
Controls also include year, age and income group dummies, age group*veteran interaction terms and a constant 
 













Table 4.  Effects of VA Reforms on Health Outcomes     
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Needs Help Personal 
Care (Probit) 
Limited in Ability to 
Work (Probit) 




Post x veteran 0.00081 0.00716** 0.02092** -0.02212** 
 (0.00072) (0.00161) (0.00205) (0.00199) 
veteran -0.00654** 0.00275 0.00336 0.03717** 
 (0.00179) (0.00420) (0.00492) (0.00942) 
years education -0.00128** -0.00611** -0.00667** 0.02606** 
 (0.00008) (0.00019) (0.00016) (0.00054) 
Employed -0.08088** -0.27913** -0.27555** 0.21792** 
 (0.00195) (0.01554) (0.01262) (0.00549) 
Midwest 0.00387** 0.01217** 0.01859** -0.01301** 
 (0.00073) (0.00264) (0.00355) (0.00285) 
South 0.00348** 0.01543** 0.01980** -0.03151** 
 (0.00069) (0.00311) (0.00424) (0.00458) 
West 0.00318** 0.01660** 0.02537** -0.01704** 
 (0.00082) (0.00393) (0.00466) (0.00540) 
Urban 0.00069* -0.00920** -0.01577** 0.02658** 
 (0.00031) (0.00301) (0.00354) (0.00405) 
Hispanic -0.00503** -0.04517** -0.05445** -0.02361** 
 (0.00050) (0.00174) (0.00286) (0.00441) 
Black 0.00045 -0.01463** -0.01396** -0.08142** 
 (0.00066) (0.00249) (0.00246) (0.00436) 
Married -0.00754** -0.03608** -0.04210** 0.03035** 
 (0.00099) (0.00270) (0.00377) (0.00418) 
Observations      241650      214890      241650      241650 
Results from estimating equation (1) with Probit regressions.   
Coefficients are probit marginal effects 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on veteran and year. 
Controls also include year, age and income group dummies , age group*veteran interaction terms and a constant.  
 


















Table 5a.  Falsification Tests:  Utilization 
 (“pre”= ’91-’92, “post”='93-'94)      
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




Dr. Visit in Past 
Yr.? (Probit) 
# Dr. Visits Last 2 
Wks (OLS) 
Dr. Visit Last 2 
Weeks? (Probit) 
“post” x veteran -0.05991 -0.00315* 0.00841+ 0.00774 0.00544** 
 (0.05382) (0.00103) (0.00441) (0.00709) (0.00105) 
Observations      135443      135443      133321      135443      135443 
Results from estimating equation (1) on 1991-1994 sample with “post” redefined as 1993-1994 and “pre” redefined as 1991-1992. 
OLS coefficients are reported in columns (1), (2) and (4). 
Probit coefficients in columns (3) and (5) are marginal effects. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on veteran and year. 
Controls also include year, age and income group dummies, an age group*veteran interaction terms and a constant. 
 





Table 5b.  Falsification Tests:  Health Outcomes 
(“pre”= ’91-’92, “post”='93-'94)      
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Needs Help Personal 
Care (Probit) 
Limited in Ability to 
Work (Probit) 




“post” x veteran -0.00206** -0.00237 -0.00714** 0.01052+ 
 (0.00032) (0.00199) (0.00182) (0.00552) 
Observations      135443      120234      135443      135443 
Results from estimating equation (1) on 1991-1994 sample with “post” redefined as 1993-1994 and “pre” redefined as 1991-1992. 
OLS coefficients are reported in columns (1), (2) and (4). 
Probit coefficients in columns (3) and (5) are marginal effects. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on veteran and year. 
Controls also include year, age and income group dummies, an age group*veteran interaction terms and a constant. 
 











































Difference in self-reported health, 
























Table 6a.  Effects on Expected Newly Eligibles       
 





Dr. Visit in 
Past Yr.? 
(Probit) 
# Dr. Visits 
Last 2 Wks 
(OLS) 






Post x veteran 0.00996 0.00952** 0.01970* 0.02679** 0.01082** -0.01339** 
 (0.01568) (0.00284) (0.00811) (0.00360) (0.00191) (0.00344) 
Observations 125840 125843 92539 125843 125843 125843 
Results are from estimating Equation (1) for the non-poor, non-disabled portion of the sample. 
OLS coefficients are reported in columns (1), (2) and (4). 
Probit coefficients in columns (3) and (5) are marginal effects. 
Dependent variables are measures of health care utilization.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on veteran and year. 
Controls also include year, age and income group dummies, age group*veteran interaction terms and a constant 
 






Table 6b.  Effects on Expected Previously Eligibles       
 





Dr. Visit in 
Past Yr.? 
(Probit) 
# Dr. Visits 
Last 2 
Wks(OLS) 





Post x veteran -0.22490* 0.01173 0.04421** 0.05154** 0.01867** -0.02786** 
 (0.10264) (0.00938) (0.00837) (0.00973) (0.00445) (0.00572) 
Observations 115710 115772 83656 115805 115807 115807 
 
Joint Sig? Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Results are from estimating Equation (1) for the poor and/or disabled portion of the sample.   
OLS coefficients are reported in columns (1), (2) and (4). 
Probit coefficients in columns (3) and (5) are marginal effects. 
Dependent variables are measures of health care utilization.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on veteran and year. 
Controls also include year, age and income group dummies, age group*veteran interaction terms and a constant 
 












Table 7a. Mean Number of Treatments in a Region-Year  
    
Pre-1997   Post-1997   
Hospital Nights 1-6 Hospital Nights 7 Hospital Nights 1-6 Hospital Nights 7 
444,752  9,853  226,955  10,898  
(232,164) (6,899) (85,964) (4,223) 
       
Surgeries 1-6 Surgeries 7 Surgeries 1-6 Surgeries 7 
13,879  315  7,757  529  
(7,127) (203) (2,659) (230) 
       
IP Procedures 1-6  IP Procedures 7 IP Procedures 1-6  IP Procedures 7 
58,384  1,308 49,741  2,772  
(40,294) (1,040) (18,020) (1,133) 
       
Discharges 1-6 Discharges 7 Discharges 1-6 Discharges 7 
32,019  685  23,427  1,296  
(16,932) (445) (7,407) (518) 
       
Clinic Visits 1-6 Clinic Visits 7 Clinic Visits 1-6 Clinic Visits 7 
663,959  20,269  5,214,600  546,784  
(514,274) (21,056) (2,100,890) (273,391) 
       
Contacts 1-6 Contacts 7 Contacts 1-6 Contacts 7 
695,900  21,032  5,232,077  554,030  
(524,492) (21,439) (2,105,674) (276,005) 
    
    
Table 7b. Mean Number of Treatments Per Pop. 1-6 In A Region-Year   
    
Pre-1997   Post-1997   
Hospital Nights 1-6/Pop 1-6 Hospital Nights 7/Pop 1-6 Hospital Nights 1-6/Pop 1-6 Hospital Nights 7/Pop 1-6 
0.9940  0.0246  0.5050  0.0266  
(0.5001) (0.0207) (0.1665) (0.0106) 
       
Surgeries 1-6/Pop 1-6 Surgeries 7/Pop 1-6 Surgeries 1-6/Pop 1-6 Surgeries 7/Pop 1-6 
0.0304  0.0007  0.0172  0.0013  
(0.0126) (0.0005) (0.0048) (0.0006) 
       
IP Procs 1-6/ Pop 1-6  IP Procs 7/ Pop 1-6  IP Procs 1-6/ Pop 1-6  IP Procs 7/ Pop 1-6  
0.1343  0.0033  0.1171  0.0071  
(0.0975) (0.0030) (0.0565) (0.0038) 
       
Discharges 1-6/Pop 1-6 Discharges 7/Pop 1-6 Discharges 1-6/Pop 1-6 Discharges 7/Pop 1-6 
0.0711  0.0016  0.0522  0.0031  
(0.0345) (0.0011) (0.0127) (0.0013) 
       
Clinic Visits 1-6/Pop 1-6 Clinic Visits 7/Pop 1-6 Clinic Visits 1-6/Pop 1-6 Clinic Visits 7/Pop 1-6 
1.4771  0.0490  11.5125  1.3161  
(1.0255) (0.0510) (3.3497) (0.6643) 
       
Contacts 1-6/Pop 1-6 Contacts 7/Pop 1-6 Contacts 1-6/Pop 1-6 Contacts 7/Pop 1-6 
1.5481  0.0509  11.5511  1.3341  





Table 8.  OLS:  Dependent Variables = Services to Priorities 1-6/Pop1-6    
   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




Surgeries Clinic Visits Total Contacts 
(Contacts7/ -0.016** -0.321** -0.011 -0.007** 3.766** 3.741** 
pop1-6)*post (0.001) (0.031) (0.007) (0.001) (0.643) (0.642) 
Observations 189 189 189 189 189 189 
Results from estimating equation (3) by OLS. 
Dependent variables are VISN-level measures of the number of services provided to priority 1-6 veterans divided by the CPS estimate 
of the total population of 1-6 veterans in the VISN.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on VISN pre and post. 
Regressions also include year and VISN fixed effects and age group controls and a constant. 
 






Table 9.  First Stage  
 
 (1) (2) 
 (Contacts7/pop1-6)*post (Contacts7/pop1-6)*post 
(pop7/pop1-6)*post 0.428**  
 (0.162)  
(pop7+Mcare/pop1-6)*post  1.757** 
  (0.437) 
Observations      189      189 
R-squared 0.91 0.92 
Dependent variables are VISN-level measures of the total number of contacts (office visits + hospital stays) provided to group 7 
veterans relative to the group 1-6 population in the VISN, interacted with the post dummy. 
Regressions also include year and VISN fixed effects and age group controls and a constant. 
 





















Table 10.  2SLS:  Dependent variables = Services to Priorities 1-6/Pop 1-6   
    
 
10a.  Instrument:  (pop7/pop1-6)*post 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 



















Observations      189      189      189      189      189      189 
Results from estimating equation (3) by 2SLS. 
Instrument is VISN ratio of total population of group 7 veterans to total population of group 1-6 veterans, interacted with the post 
dummy.  
Dependent variables are VISN-level measures of the number of services provided to priority 1-6 veterans divided by the CPS estimate 
of the total population of 1-6 veterans in the VISN.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on VISN pre and post 
Regressions also include year and VISN fixed effects and age group controls and a constant 
 




10b.  Instrument:  (pop7+Mcare/pop1-6)*post 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 



















Observations      189      189      189      189      189      189 
Results from estimating equation (3) by 2SLS. 
Instrument is VISN ratio of population of Medicare-eligible group 7 veterans to total population of group 1-6 veterans, interacted with 
the post dummy.  
Dependent variables are VISN-level measures of the number of services provided to priority 1-6 veterans divided by the CPS estimate 
of the total population of 1-6 veterans in the VISN.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on VISN pre and post 
Regressions also include year and VISN fixed effects and age group controls and a constant 
 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
 
 
 
 
